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In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
FRED BUTZ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

vs.

Case No.

7441
UNION P ACIFI·C RAILRO,AD COMpANY, a corporation,
~
Defendant and Respondent. ~
(

RESPONDENT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF
PE·TITION FOR REHEARING
Union Pacific Railroad ·Company, res·pondent, respect;
fully petitions the above entitled court for a rehearing in
the above case for the following reason:
The Supreme Court erred in holding that this case
should be submitted to a jury for determination for the
reason that the evidence was wholly insufficient to present
a jury question on the issue of the defendant's negligence.
BR~AN

P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. ·C·ORAY,
. D. A. ALSUP,
Counsel for Respondent,
UNION P A:CIFI'C RAILROAD COMPANY.
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CER'T'IFIC'ATE
Howard F. Coray, one of the attorneys for the respondent Union Pacific Railroad Company, hereby certifies
that the above and foregoing petition for rehearing is made
in good faith and not for any purpose of delaying the course
of the proceedings in the above entitled cause, and that in
his opinion there is good reason to believe that the judgment and opinion of this court rendered in the above entitled cause is erroneous, and that in his opinion said cause
ought to be re-examined.
HOWARD F. CORAY.
BRIEF
THE SUPREME CO·URT ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THIS. CASE SHOULD BE SUBMITTE·D
TO A JURY FOR DETERMINATION FOR T'HE
REASON T'HAT T'HE EVIDENC·E WAS WH·OLLY INSUFFICIENT TO PRESENT A JURY
QUESTTON ON THE ISSUE OF THE DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGEN~CE.
At the outset we wish to make it clear that we have
no quarrel with the general principles of law relied upon
by the majority of this court in arriving at the result
reached in the opinion written in this cause. But we earnestly contend that the court erred in applying these principles to the facts in the case at bar, with an erroneous conclusion as the result.
·Careful examination of this court's opinion leads us
to the conclusion that the essence of the decision of the
majority of the court that a jury question on the issue of
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negligence is presented is to be found in the following paragraph of the opinion :
"We appreciate that to apply the rule, 'further
precautions ~rere possible,' literally, is not sound
because there is no conceivable injury which by
hindsight could not have been prevented by some
precaution. The test is not "\Vhether afterward one
may see a way that the injury could have been prevented, but whether the railroad in the exercise of
ordinary prudence and care should have reasonably
foreseen the likelihood of injury. Under the circumstances of the instant case, this is a 1natter upon
which reasonable minds could well differ. 'Vhether
additional precautions should have been taken by the
defendant to provide him with a safe place to work
\Yas therefore a question for the jury."
But the plaintiff in this case charged the defendant
with negligence in paragraph VII of his complaint, as follows:
"That the· defendant was negligent, careless,
heedless and reckless at the time and place aforesaid in the following particulars :
"(a) That defendant, well knowing that
switchmen and other of defendant's employees in the
ordinary, customary and usual course of their employment were required to and did ride engines and
cars in a westerly direction along the outside baggage track while stationed on the north side of such
equipment and well knowing that such employees
were likely to be placed in a dangerous and hazardous position if baggage trucks and other equipment
were left standing on said platform so near to the
rail side thereof as to impair clearance between said
trucks and engines or cars passing said platform
on said baggage track, nevertheless· negligently, care-
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lessly and recklessly left not less than ten baggage
trucks along the said platform in a position so near
the north rail of the outside baggage track as to materially impair said clearance and to thus endanger
men riding on the north side of cars moving in a
westerly direction on said track; that as a result of
said negligent and careless conduct, plaintiff, while
stationed on the north side of a car moving by said
platform, due to the inadequate and insufficient
clearance between said baggage trucks and the side
of said car, was carried into violent contact with
said baggage trucks and caused to suffer the grievous personal injuries, loss and damage herein complained of."
No other grounds of negligence have ever been charged
against the defendant by any pleading in this case. It now
appears that this court has decided that the case should
·be submitted to a jury for determination on a theory of
negligence absolutely foreign to that charged.
The negligence charged by the complaint consists of
conduct of the defendant in allegedly leaving ten baggage
trucks along the platform in such a position as to impair
clearance. The negligence which this court now states may
be the basis of a verdict for the plaintiff is a failure to
take further and additional precautions to protect the plaintiff against misfeasance of strangers. If this case were
to be tried anew on the pleadings filed, it would be improper for the trial couri to submit the case to the jury
on the theory of negligence now outlined by this court
because such theory of negligence has never been pleaded
by this plaintiff. We are therefore at a loss to understand
how the trial court can have erred in failing to submit the
case to the jury on the theory of negligence now suggested
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by this court, since that theory was never before the trial
court for consideration under the pleadings. We have
been appreciative of the fact that modern pleading does, not
require the same particularity and specific detail as was
required at common law; but it is a disturbing experience
to discover that a complaint which charges negligence,
consisting of affirmative misconduct in leaving objects
fouling the track, will be held to support a finding that the
defendant is guilty of negligence consisting of a failure
to take additional precautions to protect a plaintiff against
misconduct of third persons. The impropriety of submitting
a case to a jury for a possible finding of negligence on a
theory of negligence not charged is patent, and we do not
propose to belabor the point further.
But the most serious criticism which we think may
fairly be leveled against the opinion of the court is that
it misapplies the law to the facts of the case and thereby
countenances a finding of negligence against the defendant
under a fact situation where such finding is unreasonable
and contrary to recognized authoritative decisions of this
and other courts. The opinion of this court holds 1that a
jury might find that the railroad in the exercise of ordinary
prudence and care should have reasonably foreseen the likelihood of injury in the situation presented on the day of the
accident and, consequently, that a jury might find that
additional precautions should have been taken by the defendant to provide plaintiff with a safe place to work. The
evidence in the case at bar did not establish by proof the
fact that the defendant had knowledge that the place of
work to which Butz was assigned was unsafe, nor was
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there any proof of circumstances indicating that the defendant should have known of the dangerous condition of
the place of work which actually existed. No evidence in
the record indicates that the situation presented on the
day of Butz' injury had ever occurred before, or that there
was any reason for the defendant to anticipate that employes. of other companies would make the place of work
unsafe by leaving baggage trucks foul of the tracks. It
therefore would seem that to permit a jury to find that
the railroad company should have foreseen the situation
which existed on the day of the accident is. stretching the
concept of foreseeability beyond its usual limits. But, even
if it is proper to hold that the railroad company should
be expected to foresee that objects would be left foul of
the track, the taking of the further step in requiring the
defendant to foresee that the plaintiff would ride the cars
into collision with such objects on a train moving at a speed
of approximately 5 miles per hour, in broad daylight, goes
beyond any notion of reasonable foreseeability and requires
of the defendant a type of foresight which is superior to
that exercised by a fortune teller looking into a crystal ball.
The evidence revealed without dispute that it was plaintiff's express duty to· discover any possible obstructions in
the path of the train and to avoid colliding with the same.
In this connection plaintiff testified as follows·:
Now you are riding on the front end of
this car for what purpose, Mr. Butz?
"Q.

"A. Why to protect the equipment I have ahold
of and also to see that we have clear going; to see
that -there ain't anybody going to walk across from
the other side in .front of them. cars, or maybe there
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would be somebody walking on this side and wouldn't
hear us coming and be too close to the track where
I would call his attention and if I couldn't call his
attention, give the sign to stop and the last thing I
have done-I have taken hold of people and grabbed
them so they would clear as long as I have railroaded.
So one of your primary duties is to keep a
lookout ahead of the movement of trains; to see what
obstacles there would be in front of it?
"A. y es, sir.
.
"Q.

And you are particularly interested and it
is part of your duty, isn't it Mr. Butz, to observe any
objects that are fouling the appearance (clearance)
of the track?
"A. y es, sir.
.
"Q.

And that is the main reason you are riding
there, isn't it?
"A. Yes, sir, to see that everything is in the
clear.
"Q. That is right, and isn't it a fact, Mr. Butz,
that every man on that crew-that is, the engineer,
the fireman, the foreman, and the pin puller are relying upon you primarily to see whether or not the
track is clear ahead?
"A. They don't just exactly rely on me. Why
if you would have a hold of about ten or fifteen cars
do you think he would look way up there that ten
or fifteen cars and see what I would do up there?
He would pay attention to the man that was. next to
him.
"Q. I understand, but the means by which the
man next to him would give the engineer signals
ordinarily by repeating the signal which you would
give. Isn't that right?
"A. Yes, if I would give the signal this man
would repeat it to the engineer.
"Q.
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"Q. That is right, so wouldn't you say, Mr.
Butz, this is a fair statement--every man on the
crew was relying primarily on the lookout which
you would keep ahead and the signals which you
would give after making such observations as you
did?
"A. Yes, sure.

So if there had been somebody standing
on the track they would have counted on you to give
the proper signal?
"A. Certainly. That is what I would have done
if I had seen a man in time ahead of me.
"Q.

I understand. If there was an engine coming in the opposite direction they would primarily
count on you to observe that and do the proper thing,
isn't that right, Mr. Butz?
"A. That is right.
"Q.

"Q.

You, in effect, were the eyes of that crew

to as·certain the condition of that track ahead, weren't
you Mr. Butz?
"A. Yes, si·r" ( R. 96-98) .
Therefore, the net result of the court's opinion is a holding
that the railroad company should foresee that the plaintiff
would fail to discharge his positive duty and may be found
guilty of negligence by reason of its failure to anticipa.te
brea·ch of duty on the part of the plaintiff and its failure
to guard against such misconduct on his part. We respectfully submit that reason cannot support such a conclusion.
Neither can such a conclusion be supported by resort to
the opinions of courts which have been confronted with
similar situations. In the case of Lasagru:t v. M c·Cartky, 111
Utah 2.H9, 177 P. 2d 734, Mr. Justice Latimer, speaking for
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the court and quoting with approval from the case of
Hardy v. Shedden Co., Ltd., said:
"But where, in the course of the employment, the
acts of third persons, not employed by the master,
may increase the danger of the service, and these
acts and their character are under the eye of the
servant, and, to the servant's knowledge, are not
under the supervision of the master, we do not think
the master is liable if injury results to the servant
from the negligence of the third persons * * *
Where the servant * * * has greater opportunity than the master to know and observe the probable results from the acts of the third person, of
which the master, to the knowledge of the servant,
has had no opportunity to judge, then it is unreasonable to hold that, with respect to such acts, the maste·r
has any obligation to the servant * * *."
The conclusion reached in the case at bar is not consistent
with the foregoing statement of this court. Negligence is
defined by this court in the Lasagna case as "the omission
to do something which a reasonable person, guided by those
considerations which ordinarily regulate the conduct of
human affairs would do : Or the doing of something which
a prudent person under like circumstances would not do."
A reasonable person presented with the situation which
existed on the day when Butz was injured, if guided by
those cons.iderations which ordinarily regulate the conduct
of human affairs, could not reasonably be expected to foresee that strangers would make the place of work of the
plaintiff unsafe and, especially, that the plaintiff himself
would fail to discharge his positive duty to avoid the very
thing. which occurred. The bare possibility that this unusual
chain of circumstances would occur was not a. sufficient
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probability that reasonable persons would foresee its occurrence.
In the case of Atlantic Coast R. R. Co. v. Craven, 185
F. 2d 176, decided November 9, 1950, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals reversed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff upon a jury verdict, with instructions to enter judgment for the defendant railroad as a matter of law. In this
suit, which was brought under the Federal Employers.' Liability Act, the plaintiff charged the defendant railroad with
negligence in maintaining a yard fraught with unnecessary
danger, in that the company had failed to provide plaintiff
with a method to cross over track along which a train was
moving without the necessity of climbing over the moving
cars. The court made the following observations concerning
liability under the federal act:
"Under the F'ederal Employers' Liability Act,
the common-law rule of ordinary prudence maintains, and a railroad is not necessarily required to
employ the latest or the safest devices * * *
We do not see how ordinary prudence could have
required the construction of a bridge or a tunnel,
or the disruption of the railroad's activities suggested by the plaintiff. That remedy would have
been all out of proportion to the risk involved. The
remedy was with plaintiff, and lay n1erely in the
exercise of that standard of personal safety that he
had been instructed to use. * * * It would
have been unreasonable to expect the railroad to
take those extreme n1easures necessary to remove
this slight danger. The railroad's duty would extend
to the removal of all dangers reasonably to be anticipated as an incident of plaintiff's employment
but this duty was fulfilled when the railroad had
defined the dangers to plaintiff and instructed him
how to a void them."
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Certainly, the injury sustained by the plaintiff in the case
of Kloet.zer v. LouisviUe & Nashville R. R. Co., 95 N. E. 2d
502, cited in Justice Wolfe's dissenting opinion, was at least
as foreseeable, as 'vas the injury to the plaintiff in the
case at bar. In that case the place of "rork to which J(loetzer
was assigned "·as unsafe, in that a baggage truck had been
placed foul of the track along which a train was traveling.
'Yhen the train struck the baggage truck the inevitable
result 'vas that the baggage truck was violently propelled
along a concrete platform where men were working. Yet,
the Illinois court held that no evidence of negligence on
the part of the defendant which employed the plaintiff had
been shown by the evidence and denied liability. In the
Kloetzer case the plaintiffhad no duties in connection with
protecting against the type of accident which occurred, so
that it was not necessary to require of the railroad that it
foresee misconduct on Kloetzer's part to sustain the conclusion that the accident should have been foreseen and
avoided by Kloetzer's employer. We therefore believe that
the Kloetzer case was a much more favorable case for the
plaintiff than is the case at bar, but, even there, the court
ruled against the plaintiff as a rnatter of law. In the case of
Texarkana & Ft. S. Ry. Co·. v. LaVelle, 26'0 S. W. 2.48, in an
almost identical situation, the T'exas courts stated:
"And clearly the railway company on this particular case was not called upon 'to prevent' the
'placing' of the skid poles for the purpose of unloading logs; for in the circumstances, the appellant had
no reasonable grounds to anticipate that the employees of the Veneer Works would do the very act on
this special occasion of leaving the skid poles so near
the cars. It is a plain and well established rule of
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law that a railway company, like any other, is not
liable for injuries caused solely by the act of strangers putting a temporary obstruction on or dangerously near its. premises, unless it also is guilty of
negligence."
In our principal brief we urged that the defendant was
not negligent because it had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the fact that a dangerous condition of the
place of work to which Butz was assigned existed. The
cases which we cited support that proposition. If such
knowledge, either actual or constructive, is shown to exist,
then there is reasonable basis for requiring the railroad
company to foresee and anticipate an accident which may
result therefrom. But the corollary of this proposition
should likewise be true, i. e. : In the absence of knowledge,
either actual or constructive, of such dangerous condition
of the premises it is improper and unreasonable to expect
the railroad company to foresee that an accident will occur.
The factor which justifies a court or jury in arriving at
the ·conclusion that an accident, which is the subject of a
suit, was reasonably foreseeable in advance is the knowledge, either actual or constructive, on the part of the defendant of the danger which existed. In the absence of
knowledge or notice of danger, foreseeability of injury
simply cannot be found to exist upon any rational basis.
As stated by this court in its opinion, it is not unreasonable to require the employer to exercise reasonable
care. to make safe the place of work of its employes, whether
on premises of the employer or on premises of a stranger.
Nor is it unreasonable to require an employer to exercise
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reasonable care at all times to discover whether or not the
place of work is safe, but it is unreasonable to require of
the employer that he foresee danger in a normally safe
place of work such as. existed in the case at bar and to require of such employer that he take "additional precautions"
to eliminate a danger which there was no reason to suspect
existed. At page 2 of the opinion this court suggests that
due care required of the defendant that certain additional
precautions be taken in addition to those which were used.
Plaintiff has never alleged a failure to take such further
precautions as an act of negligence on the part of the defendant, nor has the plaintiff alleged what further precautions on the part of the railroad company were required
to satisfy the concept of "due care." This court did not
say what precautions could or should have been taken. As
was stated by Mr. Justice Wolfe in his dissenting opinion,
there was nothing structurally wrong with the track and
nothing ·inherently dangerous in the physical layout of the
yard. Under these circumstances, the probability of injury
hardly justified or required extraordinary, and as yet, unspecified steps by the defendant to prevent an accident.
If the individuals in charge of the railroad company's
operations at Denver should. foresee an accident from the
car movement that was in progress when Butz was injured,
then they should foresee an accident on any car movement
into an inhabited area, even if a man rides the "point" of
the cars with the positive duty of acting as a lookout for
the train crew to avoid possible accidents.
We therefore request that this court re-examine the
facts of this case and reconsider the question as to whether
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or not the evidence presented brings the case fairly within
the legal principles announced by the court, i. e. : Whether
or not this accident was reasonably foreseeable in ad.vance
of the event. We believe that such a re-examination will
result in a conclusion that error has been committed in
holding that the plaintiff made a case sufficient to be submitted to a jury on the issue of the defendant's negligence.

BRYAN P. LEVERICH,
M. J. BRONSON,
A. U. MINER,
HOWARD F. C'ORAY,
D. A. ALSUP,
Counsel for Resp·ondent,
UNION P A CIFI;C RAILROAD C'OMP ANY.
1
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